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Less than six months after its entry into the European Union (EU), the
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) has been opened against Croatia. The govern-
ment of Croatia now has to propose a corrective plan in order to bring the public
deficit below 3% of GDP within a few years2. It is not the first time that an EDP
coincides with entry into the EU. In 2004, six new members (the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) were subject to a similar experi-
ence. But times are different. As Croatia entered the EU, the economies of its
main trading partners were plagued by more than five years of crisis, and the
negative risks for their projected recovery were still significant3. Economic condi-
tions were comparatively much better in the EU in 2004. As a result, to bring its
public deficit below 3% of GDP, a country under EDP could reasonably expect
that a significant part of its adjustment would come from higher growth rather
than from pure fiscal consolidation (expenditure cuts and/or tax increases). Yet,
in 2004, the financial markets were aware of that and, consequently, required
only minor additional risk premiums on the public debt of countries under EDP.
1. I am very grateful to Guillaume Allègre, Christophe Blot and Evens Salies for their useful remarks and
comments on a previous version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
2. More precisely, the EDP is activated against an EU country when the European Commission
establishes that the breach of the deficit’s rule (i.e. 3% of GDP) is neither exceptional nor temporary. The
decision of the European Commission is based on the analysis of the Fiscal Notification submitted by each
Member State in April and October of each year.
3. Looking at GDP projections for 2016 as published by the Ministry of Finance in September 2013
shows that growth in Croatia would become almost negligible without the contribution of exports of
goods and services: it would never exceed 0.7% on a yearly basis ceteris paribus.
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help it bring its public deficit below 3% of GDP. More importantly, Croatia has
already done a lot in terms of fiscal consolidation and exhausted (almost) all
measures involving expenditure cuts and tax increases. In this context, what
other measures could be recommended? That’s a tricky question, especially if we
have in mind that the measures should not further depress Croatia’s economy.
According to the forecasts of the Ministry of Finance, the GDP of Croatia will
recover only gradually in the forthcoming years, with its real growth accelerating
to 2.2% in 2015 and 2.5% in 2016 (Table 1). These figures contrast sharply with
those observed for the pre-crisis period (4.6% of yearly real growth over 2004-
2007). The rate of unemployment currently stands at 16.5%, with employment
showing only timid signs of recovery for the upcoming three years.
Table 2 presents some figures related to the projection of public finances in
Croatia, based on information available in mid-September 2013. Projections
were made by Croatia’s government before the EDP was initiated against the
country. They reveal a clear breach of both the deficit rule (3% of GDP) and the
debt rule (60%) in the forthcoming years. In 2014, the loss of revenues is mainly
due to a fall in taxes on profits (due to the sluggish activity in 2013 combined
with a low tax rate on reinvested profit) as well as to a fall in property incomes
Table 1. Selected indicators for the economy of Croatia
In %
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2004-2007
Real GDP growth rate -2.0 0.2 1.3 2.2 2.5 4.6
Inflation rate 3.4 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.9
Unemployment rate 15.9 16.5* n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.9
Employment growth -3.1 -2.4 0.3 1.2 1.4 3.5
* Figures for the third quarter of 2013
Source: Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines for the 2014-2016 period, Ministry of Finance. Forecasts for 2014-
2016.
Table 2. Selected data for the public finances of Croatia*
In % of GDP
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total revenues 40.0 40.5 39.6 40.1 40.2
Total expenditures 41.6 41.8 42.7 42.7 42.3
Deficit (-) or surplus (+) -3.5 -3.5 -5.5 -5.1 -4.5
Public debt 53.7 58.1 62.0 64.1 64.7
* Figures are for the consolidated general government.
Source: Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines for the 2014-2016 period, Ministry of Finance. Forecasts for 2014-
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Croatia under the Excessive Deficit Procedure(due to lower concession fees, profits of state-owned companies and revenues
based on loans granted). For expenditures, financial expenses (debt servicing
and inclusion of public enterprises’ debt in public debt) as well as grants (contri-
butions to the EU budget and EU co-financing) are key factors explaining the
jump in 2014 onwards.
In what follows, we consider a list of measures that Croatia could envisage in
order to curb its fiscal deficit and public debt. For each measure, we present the
main arguments “in favor of” and “against” in general terms. Then, we discuss
the relevance of the measure for Croatia.
■ Doing nothing at all or, put differently, continuing the current course 
of business
The main argument “in favor” of this behavior is that the EU does not in any
case have any real power to punish a country that does not respect its EU obliga-
tions. The principle of fines and sanctions would be inoperative. For instance, the
freezing of EU funds would not be a credible sanction. Moreover, the Council
would have no alternative but to be merciful with respect to the country under
EDP if (1) economic times are particularly hard in the country, (2) unemployment
stands at a high level, or (3) the population is reluctant to make further efforts
and is engaged in street demonstrations, etc.
The main argument “against” is that financial market operators may think
very differently from those advocating this behavior and, consequently, may
require high risk premiums on the public bonds of countries under EDP that are
not engaged in corrective plans.
Should the government of Croatia adopt this behavior? Certainly not, for two
main reasons. First, taking a risk of freezing EU funds may be harmful for the
country, which is to receive a significant amount of EU funds in the coming
years4. Croatian enterprises engaged in EU co-financing would suffer from a
freeze on EU funds, with spillover effects on other local enterprises. Important
projects (for instance, in infrastructure) would probably have to be interrupted.
Second, in recent years, financial market operators have practiced discrimination
across government issuers, with some of them paying very high risk premiums on
their bonds (to name a few: Greece in the worst times of the debt crisis and
Latvia during its bailout by the international community in late 2008). A higher
interest rate on the public debt would be costly for the Croatian economy and
would exacerbate further the public deficit. Based on figures published by the
Ministry of finance in September 2013, financial expenses (mainly debt servicing)
would reach HRK 14.5bn in 2016, which would represent 10.2% of total public
expenditures at that time (against 7.5% in 2012). Paying a higher interest on
public debt would divert public funds from other (more productive) uses.
4. EU funds for the central government may reach up to HRK 8.4bn in 2016, which would represent
50% of the projected public deficit of Croatia (estimated to 4.5% of GDP). Of course, EU funds will not be
used to finance the public deficit. But that computation allows scaling both the importance of EU funds
and the huge need of government resources for Croatia.briefing paper no. 6/January 27, 2014 3
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This measure has two main advantages. First, it would induce an immediate
fall in public expenditures through a lower wage bill. Second, if labor mobility is
significant across sectors, a decrease in public sector wages would spill over to
the private sector, which would improve the economy’s external competitive-
ness. Net exports and, then, growth would resume. On the other hand, the main
argument “against” lower wages is that household consumption would be
depressed, then exerting downward pressure on growth. 
To be successful, this strategy requires vigorous external demand. Otherwise,
net exports would not resume and only the negative effects of this measure
would materialize (i.e. GDP would fall due to lower consumption). Moreover, to
be fruitful, every country cannot be engaged in an internal devaluation at the
same time (Levasseur, 2012). Otherwise, external demand would drop irremedi-
ably. That would be especially the case if large countries (e.g. Germany, France)
embarked on internal devaluation.
Should the government of Croatia lower the wages of its civil servants and
state agents? Certainly not. The European recovery is too timid and uncertain for
Croatia to benefit from a strategy of internal devaluation. Gains in external
competitiveness would translate into only minor gains of foreign market share,
provided that a contagion from public to private wages has effectively occurred.
The GDP of Croatia would be negatively affected due to the shrinkage of house-
hold consumption. Moreover, from 1 July 2015 (which is the expected date for
lifting the restrictions on free mobility of Croatian workers within the EU), down-
ward pressure on wages in Croatia could result in outflows toward EU countries
that offer higher wages. The long-term (“permanent”) migration of high-skilled
workers (e.g. engineers) might occur as well as the short-term (“within one
year”) migration of low-skilled workers (e.g.in agriculture and construction). The
migration of Croatian workers would be detrimental to long-term growth (“brain
drain”) and would disrupt both social and family life in Croatia.
In recent years the public wage bill was kept under control. Bonuses and extra
payments were frozen in 2013 and are planned to be frozen in 2014 too. Yet, for
the whole economy, average real wages have fallen by about 3% since 2008. In
this context, projected yearly (nominal) growth of 3.2% for the public wage bill
over the three upcoming years (as published in the Strategy of the Ministry of
Finance in September 2013) appears quite reasonable. The share of the wage bill
in total public expenditures would decrease slightly to 16% in 2016.
■ Using service concession contracts when public management is poor
There are clear arguments in favor of this measure. First, it allows modernizing
and building the infrastructure necessary to maintain and improve critical public
services. Second, service concession contracts may be a regular (and important)
source of revenues (through receipts of concession fees) and/or savings (through
lower subsidies) for the government. Moreover, service concession contracts that
are associated with large investments by the operator may benefit the economy
as a whole (through spillover effects).4 briefing paper no. 6/January 27, 2014
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have to pay a higher tariff. The more the government puts priority on the reduc-
tion of its public deficit, the more likely it is to choose an operator willing to
accept a low subsidy and/or a high concession fee, and the more likely the
chosen operator is to charge the highest tariff.
All in all, the main point is not to ask whether concessions as a measure are
good, but rather how a concession contract is awarded, to which operator and
under what conditions. A good concession contract can be defined as follows: it
should offer a service of good quality at a reasonable price to users and should
comply with certain principles (in particular, protection of the environment and
the cultural heritage)5. It means that concession contracts have to be awarded in
a competitive and transparent way, so that a sufficient number of bidders are
interested in becoming the operator. In this respect, openness to foreign bidders
(or “investors”) should be positive. Last but not least, politicians should have no
interest in favoring one bidder over another. In other words, corruption should
be actively fought and no bribe should allow winning the concession contract.
For several years, the government of Croatia has embarked on a process of
service concessions. A New Concession Act was adopted in December 2012.
Recent concessions include Zagreb’s airport and Rijeka’s port, while motorways
and Brijuni’s island have also been proposed to bidders. To the outside eye, those
concession services appear an efficient way to maintain and modernize critical
public services. We find service concessions, especially in the transportation
sector, positive for the economy. They boost tourism and pave the way for
Croatia to become a regional logistics hub in Central and Southeastern Europe.
The views of Croatian citizens may be different, though. Some of them
perceive concessions as a gift to private enterprises. In particular, the concession
fee for motorways has been criticized for being too low, i.e. EUR 3bn (or less than
HRK 23bn) for a concession period of 30-50 years. This amount is to be used to
pay the debts of the HAC and ARZ motorways; it is currently estimated at above
EUR 4bn and cannot be rescheduled. Communication to citizens about the ratio-
nality of service concessions as well as about the way service concessions are
awarded should be intensified and improved. Communication could include the
consultation of the financial and technical reports that the assessment of each
bidder is based on. Similar communication should be undertaken regarding the
privatization of public-owned enterprises (see next point).
■ Going through the privatization of (some) public-owned enterprises
This strategy is more radical than service concession contracts. The main
advantage of privatization (compared to service concession) is that cash is imme-
diately available to reduce debt and deficit, and potentially large amounts can be
obtained from the proceeds of privatization. But privatization is an (almost) irre-
versible process, whereas the government can change operator at the term of
5. More precisely, a good concession contract should allow doing all of the above better/more efficiently
than public entities.briefing paper no. 6/January 27, 2014 5
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provided to users. 
In the case of Croatia, the privatization of state-owned enterprises that are not
natural monopolies and/or of strategic importance (i.e. in the tourism and agri-
culture sectors) should be encouraged. Privatization, by changing the incentives
that influence management, would enhance the efficiency of enterprises. The
privatization of other state-owned enterprises should be envisaged more care-
fully, but not excluded. Croatia is the first country to join the EU with such a large
share of state-owned enterprises (25%), and the slow pace of privatization has
hindered growth. More privatizations will result in (long-run) gains even if
causing (short run) pains, in particular layoffs among the workforce6.
In any case, abstracting from privatization, some state-owned enterprises
should be restructured if they are to provide public services or goods in a more
efficient manner.
■ Improving tax collection and compliance
Uncollected taxes obviously constitute a loss of revenue for the government.
But uncollected taxes also have distortion effects, since the tax burden is shifted
onto those who cannot easily practice tax evasion (due to controls) or do not
want to practice tax evasion (due to morality). Those benefiting from public
services are not necessarily those paying taxes, which is unfair when they have a
similar level of income. More generally, public goods are provided sub-optimally
when uncollected taxes are substantial, and the government’s capacity is
reduced (Bejakovic, 2008)7. 
In the case of Croatia, increasing tax collection means several interrelated
things: fighting the grey economy (since unreported incomes are untaxed
incomes) and prosecuting tax fraud (otherwise, rules and procedures are
useless). This also means fighting corruption.
According to the Institute of Public Finance, uncollected tax revenues in
Croatia would amount to HRK 40bn, which represents more than twice the
projected public deficit for 2014 (HRK 19.3bn). Should the government be
capable of collecting at least a portion of this, it would give a little breathing
room to the public finances.
■  Lowering (up to cancelling) the corporate tax rate
The main advantage (and goal) of a low corporate tax rate is to attract foreign
direct investment (FDI) in order to stimulate production in the host country.
However, fiscal incentives are not generally sufficient to attract FDI. Other condi-
tions are required in the host economy, especially a well-educated labor force
6.  See Cuckovic, Jurlin and Vuckovic (2011) on the gains and pains associated with privatization of
public utilities in Croatia, LSEE External Research Project.
7.  Predrag BEJAKOVIĆ (2008), Tax evasion, state capacity and trust in transitional countries: the case of
Croatia. 6 briefing paper no. 6/January 27, 2014
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Another important condition is that other countries (and in particular, those with
similar characteristics in terms of endowments, education, development, etc.) do
not engage in a race to the bottom in terms of corporate tax rates. Otherwise,
the tax base would shrink and no country would succeed in attracting FDI. 
The outcome of this strategy in terms of fiscal revenue is uncertain. On the
one hand, the corporate tax rate is reduced (or even null), which lowers (or elim-
inates) fiscal revenues. On the other hand, economic activity is stimulated, which
results in a larger tax base for direct and indirect fiscal revenues. 
In a small country like Croatia, with a labor force of 1.7 million persons, a
handful of (large) greenfield FDI is sufficient for hiring a large share of the unem-
ployed. Thus, lowering the corporate tax rate could be seen as a good measure.
However, corruption in Croatia would probably deter almost all FDI even with a
zero corporate tax rate. Note that there are currently some fiscal exemptions in
Croatia (through free zones or no tax on reinvested profit for foreign entities)
which have not yet succeeded in attracting large FDI in Croatia. The problem at
stake is not the corporate tax rate, nor labor force education, but corruption.
Croatia does not differ substantially from its neighbors in terms of the corporate
tax rate (20% against 17% in Slovenia, 19% in Hungary and 23% in Slovakia).
Like its neighboring countries, Croatia has a well-educated labor force. However,
the amount of FDI hosted by Croatia is not as large as that of most of its Central
and Eastern European counterparts due to a deteriorated business environment.
■ Activating the OMT mechanism
The “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT) mechanism, which is docu-
mented in Creel and Timbeau (2012), could not be activated in the case of
Croatia, as it requires EMU membership (i.e. adoption of the euro). Anyway, a
country activating the OMT mechanism would not avoid a corrective plan to
curb its public deficit. Only the cost of borrowing would be reduced through a
process of debt mutualization.
To summarize: in order to put its public finances on a sound track, Croatia has
no alternative but pursuing the restructuring of its state-owned enterprises,
through either service concessions or privatization. However, this restructuring
process should be more controlled to prevent misguided choices, abuse or
conflicts of interest. Civil society should be included in the process. More gener-
ally, communication to citizens on both sides of public finances (revenue as well
as expenditure) should be intensified: budgetary authorities should explain what
they are doing, why they are doing it, and what the long-run benefits of their
actions will be.
Improving tax collection and compliance is another important measure which
is highly recommended for Croatia’s public finances. That calls for changes in the
mentality of those practicing tax evasion through communications about the
limited resources of the government. But, and perhaps more importantly, this
also calls for strong anti-corruption actions to annihilate tax extortion.briefing paper no. 6/January 27, 2014 7
